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Abstract: This paper presents differences in firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) 
across 22 manufacturing and 17 service industries in Germany over the period 1995–
2004. It is an attempt to study whether and to what extent foreign multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are more productive relative to German firms. As well as 
distinguishing between foreign and domestic firms, we also distinguish between German 
MNEs and domestic firms that do not have any foreign presence. Controlling for 
endogeneity through semi-parametric techniques, our findings indicate considerable 
heterogeneity in firm performance across types of firms. The foreign/domestic distinction 
is not as clear cut as has been suggested elsewhere; multinationality is important in 
explaining productivity differences rather than foreignness.  
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1. Introduction 
Much of the theoretical literature on multinational enterprises (MNEs) starts with the 
presumption that FDI is motivated by the desire to exploit some form of firm-specific 
advantage in another country (Dunning, 1988). When examining firms in a given 
location, this advantage then leads to foreign investors being on average more 
productive than domestic firms. Indeed, this presumption is the basis for the literature 
concerning the potential spillover effects of inward investment in a given location (for 
reviews see Blomström et al., 2001; Görg and Greenaway, 2004). However, the 
limited evidence that exists for Germany suggests that this productivity differential is 
not clear cut; Bellak and Pfaffermayr (2002) for example argue that some results 
suggest that domestically-owned firms can indeed outperform foreign-owned firms, 
contrary to expectations. Generally however, such findings vary with the performance 
measure used and the level of technology employed in the firms concerned. 
Subsidiaries with low-skill, labour intensive assembly line operations may be less 
productive than their domestic counterparts which may use superior technology in the 
same industry. 
 
Most work in this area focuses on the comparison between foreign and domestic firms 
in a given location.  Much of this is based on the UK (Davies and Lyons, 1991; 
Oulton, 1998a, b; Griffith, 1999), the United States (Howenstine and Zeile, 1992; 
Doms and Jensen, 1998) and Canada (Globerman et al., 1994). There is surprisingly 
little work on this for Germany, arguably the most technologically advanced country 
in Europe, which attracts in excess of 10 per cent of inward investment into the EU.  
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This chapter offers two contributions. First, it presents a detailed and systematic 
analysis of productivity differences at the firm-level in German manufacturing and 
service industries for the various regions of Germany over 10 years. Second, it 
highlights the differences in performance across foreign subsidiaries of different 
nationalities, and domestic MNEs on the one hand and domestic non-MNEs2 on the 
other hand. Much of the analysis in this area hitherto has ignored the distinction 
between purely domestic firms, and home country multinationals, which to quote 
Doms and Jensen (1998) is equivalent to “comparing apples and oranges”.  
 
Germany offers an interesting contrast to many recipients of inward investment, in 
that it has high levels of indigenous technological development, mainly in the 
Western states, but at the same time still relatively underdeveloped Eastern states. 
This has been the situation since unification, despite 18 years of enormous financial 
transfers from the federal government to the Eastern states. The attempt to modernize 
the backward state of the Eastern regions and narrowing the gap in living standards 
between East and West Germany has taken much longer than anticipated (Sinn, 
2002). As it was only after unification in 1990 that the former East Germany opened 
up to foreign investments, one would expect significant differences in firm-level 
productivity across German regions and types of firms. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 gives an overview of 
previous empirical studies of productivity differences, with a particular focus on 
Germany.  Section 3 describes our data set and offers some descriptive statistics.  
                                                 
2 These are firms with only domestic operations which may or may not export. 
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Section 4 discusses the econometric approach and the methodology involved.  Section 
5 presents the results and section 6 concludes and offers some future lines of research. 
 
2 Previous Empirical Evidence 
As the economic rationale for the special treatment of foreign-owned firms, policy-
makers cite positive externalities generated by FDI through productivity spillovers 
from foreign to domestic firms (Department of Trade and Industry, 2006). This in fact 
will only occur if MNEs are superior to domestic firms in their technological 
capability or productivity performance. This technological advantage of foreign 
investors over domestic firms has in recent years become a stylised fact in the applied 
and policy-oriented literature concerned with FDI flows or the impacts of inward 
investment. Indeed, many empirical studies have found MNEs to be more productive.  
 
Davies and Lyons (1991) measure the extent to which foreign firms operating in the 
UK have an aggregate productivity advantage3 over domestic firms in UK 
manufacturing industries over the period 1971-1987. Recognising that data for 
aggregate manufacturing fail to control for the possibility that foreign firms may be 
attracted to more productive industries and are disproportionately represented in such 
industries (structural effect), they develop a two-tier decomposition method to 
distinguish between the structural and ownership effect at the 2-digit and 3-digit 
industry level. They find that foreign firms are on average 48.6 per cent more 
productive, which is 23.5 per cent due to the ownership effect and 20.3 per cent due to 
the structural effect. Davies and Lyons (1991) among others cast doubt on the 
                                                 
3 They define productivity as gross value added per person employed. 
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reliability of the cross-sectional evidence of previous studies due to an endogeneity 
bias. It is argued, that much of the superior performance of MNEs is likely made up of 
compositional effects and omitted variables (Conyon et al., 2004).  
 
Oulton (1998a, 1998b) are among the first studies to examine productivity differences 
at a more disaggregated level, using both plant and firm-level data from the Annual 
Respondents Database (ARD) dataset for UK manufacturing and the OneSource4 data 
set for the UK services sector. For UK manufacturing Oulton (1998a) estimates 
labour productivity (value added per worker) to be 38 per cent higher for foreign 
subsidiaries relative to domestic firms. For UK service industries Oulton (1998b) 
finds a foreign productivity advantage of one-third compared with domestic firms. In 
both of these studies, the variation in performance is due to foreign firms using high 
physical and human capital-intensive factors of production. 
 
Griffith (1999) using the ARD establishment level data set analyses TFP differences 
in the UK motor vehicle industry over the period 1980-1992. This industry is chosen 
by Griffith because it has the highest proportion of foreign ownership among all other 
UK industries. The findings of Griffith (1999) demonstrate a significant TFP 
advantage for German and US subsidiaries over UK domestic firms. Griffith and 
Simpson (2004) extend this analysis by taking into account all UK manufacturing 
industries over the period 1980 to 1996. Again, their methodology is along standard 
lines of estimating Cobb Douglas production functions using dummies for various 
firm nationalities and controlling for age, size of establishment and probability of exit 
                                                 
4 The OneSource database is commercially available, and like Amadeus based on company account 
data. It is however limited to larger firms than the threshold for Amadeus, and limited to the UK. The 
ARD covers the UK manufacturing sector, and services since 1997, at the establishment level. This 
however does not include financial information, or details of ownership structures. See Griffith (1999) 
and Oulton (1998b) for detailed description of the ARD and OneSource, respectively. 
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and time effects. Their findings suggest that establishments under foreign ownership 
have higher labour productivity than under domestic ownership.  
 
A significant shortcoming of these and related studies5 which compare foreign firms 
with all domestic plants is that they may seriously be affected by a “selection 
problem” because the group of domestic firms is heterogeneous (Criscuolo and 
Martin, 2005). Domestic plants include non-MNEs as well as MNEs which can rival 
foreign-owned firms in terms of productivity levels. Thus, the superior productivity 
performance of foreign firms may not be a foreign ownership advantage per se, but 
may simply reflect a MNE advantage. Studies incorporating this aspect are Doms and 
Jensen (1998) for the US, Criscuolo and Martin (2005) for the UK, Bellak and 
Pfaffermayr (2002) for Austria, Bellmann and Jungnickel (2002) for Germany. These 
studies essentially find that foreign subsidiaries have higher productivity than 
domestic non-MNEs while foreign and domestic MNEs differ only marginally, 
whereby U.S. subsidiaries are the most productive. 
 
Recent work by Arnold and Hussinger (2006) tests the prediction by Helpman et al. 
(2004) that the most productive firms in an economy are those that invest abroad. 
They present total factor productivity differences among a subset of German firms for 
the period 1996 to 2002. However their data does not include foreign-owned firms. 
Nevertheless, they are able to divide German firms into non-exporting domestic firms 
which they find to be least productive, followed by domestic exporting firms, while 
firms which undertake FDI are the most productive. Wagner (2006) also shows 
                                                 
5 See, e.g. Howenstine and Zeile (1992), Globerman et al. (1994), Braconier and Ekholm (2002) and 
Bellak and Pfaffermayr (2002). 
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evidence supporting the Helpman et al. (2004) hypothesis for a sample of 
manufacturing firms6 operating in the German state of Lower Saxony.  
 
Bellmann and Jungnickel (2002) show that foreign-owned firms are more productive 
than German non-MNEs as well as German MNEs. As the authors acknowledge 
however, their data has several limitations, namely relying on turnover rather than 
value added to capture productivity, and having limited data on multinationality7.  
 
Peri and Urban (2006) test whether foreign-owned and West German firms induce 
technological spillovers in favour of domestic firms in the Eastern regions of 
Germany. They find foreign-owned and West German firms to be more productive 
than East German firms and show evidence for a positive technological catch-up 
process of local East German firms through productivity spillovers. However, the 
focus in Peri and Urban (2006) is the spillover process and thus they do not analyse 
productivity differences in any great detail. For example, they do not test for 
differences in Western regions, but more importantly they do not distinguish by type 
of domestic firm. 
 
Most of the studies mentioned above concentrate on the manufacturing sector, either 
on aggregate or at the firm-level, which is certainly due to the fact that micro-data for 
the service sector is not readily available for many countries. Another difficulty is 
finding appropriate deflators for monetary variables in this sector. The present paper 
incorporates the services sector in the analysis in addition to the manufacturing sector. 
                                                 
6 Information on these firms was collected in personal interviews. However, using a partial productivity 
measure (value-added per employee) on a cross-section in the year 1995 is a disadvantage, as 
acknowledged by the author. 
7 German MNEs are proxied by an export quota of at least 30 per cent. 
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This is important because the services sector is a knowledge-intensive sector which 
plays an ever more important role in advanced economies attracting large amounts of 
foreign investment. Also, it is of high significance from a policy perspective to know 
performance differences in order to identify the industries which are promising in 
terms of spillovers (we will return to this point in the conclusion).  
 
3. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
Our data is taken from Amadeus8, a rich firm-level dataset, provided by Bureau van 
Dijk, which is an electronic publishing and consultancy firm. A growing number of 
researchers have used this data set in recent years to analyse various economic issues, 
including Helpman et al. (2004), Budd et al. (2005) and Konings and Murphy (2006). 
It offers detailed financial and other operational information on private and public 
companies operating in Western as well as Eastern European countries. The dataset 
used in this paper comes from the intermediate version9 of Amadeus. 
 
Detailed information about ownership structure is given for every year of the sample 
period. This is an advantage to previous studies which assume (using the same data 
set) that the ownership information for the latest year of their sample period is valid 
for the entire period (e.g. Konings and Murphy, 2006; Peri and Urban, 2006). 
                                                 
8 Analyse Major Databases from EUropean Sources. Bureau van Dijk compiles public and private 
company accounts from so called regional information providers (IPs) which are either Central Banks, 
Official statistical offices or a credit rating agency. The data for Germany are retrieved by Bureau van 
Dijk from annual company accounts published by Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating 
agency.  
9 The three versions are the top 250,000 companies in Europe, the top 1.5 million and all companies 
which amount to approximately 9 million firms (including small firms). Using the intermediate version 
of Amadeus, the selection of firms is based on satisfying at least one of the following criteria: number 
of employees equal to at least 20, total operating revenues and total assets equaling to at least €1.5 
million and €3 million, respectively. This of course includes the coverage of purely domestic firms 
which on average are smaller (see table 3); though for the comparison of large to medium sized inward 
investors with domestic counterparts this presents no obvious problems. 
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Although the actual timing of the investment decision is not given in the data set, we 
can in effect trace changes in ownership for most firms and determine the amount and 
the source country of the foreign capital throughout the panel period using earlier 
Amadeus releases retrieved from historical discs.  
 
Another unique feature of the data set is the identification of foreign-owned firms as 
well as domestic MNEs, an issue which is rarely addressed in the literature. For each 
firm, data on the country of the holding company which owns the company in 
question and the country of the ultimate holding company is given. Either or both of 
these may of course be missing, in which case we assume that it is a German-owned 
firm. 
 
A foreign firm is defined as one in which at least 10 per cent of equity is owned by a 
foreign business entity. This threshold is suggested and used for statistical purposes 
by the IMF10, UNCTAD (2005), OECD11; many OECD countries, including 
Germany12 and is common in the literature (e.g. see Griffith et al. 2004; and Doms 
and Jensen, 1998). The threshold of 10% is considered to represent a meaningful 
stake and effective voice in the management of the firm. The nationality of a firm is 
determined by the ultimate parent’s country of ownership13. All firms not meeting this 
criterion are defined as German owned including firms without ownership 
information, which is common practice for the database (Peri and Urban, 2006)14. 
                                                 
10 See Balance of Payments Manual (IMF, 1993). 
11 See Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (OECD, 1996). 
12 See Deutsche Bundesbank’s Zahlungsbilanzstatistik September 2006, pp.48-9 or International 
Capital Links April 2006 pp.19-20. 
13 If the ultimate owner is not known, the country of ownership is identified using the nationality of the 
immediate owner. This is a reasonable assumption as the percentage ownership is directly used in the 
analysis. We have experimented with various specifications which do not change the results. 
14 There are gaps in reports when the data is not made available by the firms either in accordance with 
the national laws or in violation with the national laws. Germany, according to BvD, is a special case as 
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Subsidiary information, i.e. either name or operating revenue of the subsidiary, is 
taken as evidence that a German firm is a MNE.  
 
Due to variation in national reporting requirements, a significant number of firms 
have limited financial information; missing observations for variables considered in 
this analysis or are simply inactive. We simply include company information on the 
basis of data availability and exclude outliers15. Table 1 shows the distribution of 
firms by firm-type for the year 200216. Firms are classified according to the NACE 
industry classification at the 2-digit level. For a detailed list of NACE codes and 
industries see Appendix 5A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1  Distribution of Manufacturing Firms and Service Firms (2002) 
 Manufacturing Services 
Non-MNED 2,672 5,928 
MNED   326 366 
                                                                                                                                            
accounts are only made available for around 15,000 firms (which include many small companies).  
Other German firms, mainly private firms, do not file their accounts and are thus not included even 
though they would meet the selection criteria. 
15 To exclude possible outliers we excluded from the sample the top and bottom one percentile of all 
the firm-specific output and input variables. We also dropped unusual changes in observations which 
seemed to be “key punch errors” such as negative values for intermediate inputs, capital and where 
intermediate inputs were greater than output. 
16 We choose to show the distribution of firms for the year 2002 for two reasons. Firstly, most firms are 
observed in year 2002 which due to the unbalanced nature of our panel means that not all firms are 
observed throughout the panel period. But more importantly, the distribution of firms across regions, 
industries and ownership status does not change significantly in either the manufacturing or the service 
sector over time. Thus, choosing a representative year suffices for illustrative purposes. 
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MNEF   376 675 
Note: MNED and MNEF represent domestic and foreign multinationals, respectively. Non-
MNED stands for German non-multinational firms. In each year, a foreign firm is defined as 
one in which at least 10 per cent is owned by a foreign business entity. All firms not meeting 
this criterion are defined as German owned.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from Amadeus data set. 
 
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics on the key variables employed. They reveal 
that German MNEs are on average larger, more capital intensive and have higher 
sales figures than foreign-owned firms followed by domestic non-MNEs.  
 
 
Table 2  Descriptive Statistics 
  
Mean (Standard deviation) 
 
 MNEF MNED Non-MNED 
Sales 
 
251,720 
(492,192) 
420,962 
(666,545) 
106,222 
(296,944) 
Capitala 
 
100,543 
(262,592) 
197,571 
(365,910) 
74,240 
(205,536) 
No of 
Employees  
1,273 
(2,460) 
2,404 
(3,768) 
788 
(1,928) 
Material  
Costs 
178,104 
(341,586) 
265,351 
(426,011) 
72,794 
(213,325) 
a Capital is measured as the book value of the firm’s fixed assets. 
Note: Figures are calculated over the period 1995-2004. All monetary values are deflated and 
expressed in thousands of US$.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from Amadeus data set. 
 
 
 
An overview of the regional and sectoral distribution of all manufacturing and service 
firms is presented in Tables 3 and 4. Around 85 per cent of all foreign manufacturing 
subsidiaries and 94 per cent of all foreign services subsidiaries are located in the 
Western states. The Eastern states are host to a minority which is not very surprising 
considering the still relative underdeveloped regions of the East and the many 
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important determinants which foreign investors consider prior to investing. The 
sectoral composition shows substantial differences in foreign presence, from low 
levels of a few per cent to around 75 per cent in some industries.  
 
 
 
Table 3  Regional breakdown (2002) 
 Manufacturing Services 
 
Non-
MNED 
 
MNED MNEF 
Non-
MNED 
 
MNED MNEF 
Baden-Württemberg 353 62 46 611 59 92 
Bayern 422 63 83 1,070 78 154 
Berlin 41 15 8 269 19 22 
Bremen 9 1 3 42 6 2 
Hamburg 27 13 6 141 16 42 
Hessen 184 23 34 492 43 100 
Niedersachsen 246 28 27 524 17 27 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 599 90 86 1,166 97 171 
Rheinland-Pfalz 77 12 8 135 8 11 
Saarland 33 7 2 57 3 5 
Schleswig-Holstein 48 8 8 124 8 11 
       
Brandenburg* 96 1 3 216 1 5 
Mecklenburg-Vorp.* 85 1 8 313 3 11 
Sachsen* 250 5 24 532 7 15 
Sachsen-Anhalt* 95 2 13 135 1 4 
Thüringen* 107 6 6 101 1 3 
Note: * denote states in Eastern Germany. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Amadeus data set. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  Distribution of firms across industries, 2002 
NACE  
classification 
Non-
MNED MNE
D MNEF Foreign employment by industrya (per cent) 
Manufacturing: Low-technology 
15 220 21 18 7.21 
17 54 8 15 38.14 
18 37 5 4 27.45 
19 6 1 4 75.05 
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20 71 4 11 43.11 
21 42 10 12 8.13 
22 107 6 12 46.33 
23 11 0 2 10.01 
25 99 21 16 14.45 
26 95 14 12 28.04 
27 87 17 16 27.44 
28 348 19 28 19.35 
36 68 10 13 7.11 
37 26 2 0 0.00 
Manufacturing: High-technology 
24 135 32 43 21.21 
29 306 69 48 19.18 
31 114 16 24 30.15 
34 60 17 11 16.41 
35 48 4 8 33.32 
30 35 3 7 19.33 
32 53 13 23 15.41 
33 111 19 30 20.16 
Services: Low-technology 
45 936 19 33 17.18 
50 312 4 24 18.45 
51 1,209 89 258 18.32 
52 440 13 40 18.00 
55 48 2 7 27.49 
60 242 7 4 5.08 
63 231 9 23 3.47 
Services: High-technology 
61 18 2 5 75.11 
62 7 1 0 0.00 
64 23 1 1 5.03 
65 38 2 5 48.26 
67 25 2 3 10.33 
70 881 11 21 5.29 
71 74 5 6 2.12 
72 291 27 47 16.32 
73 58 4 11 52.22 
74 1,095 168 187 16.49 
a Per cent share of that industry’s employment accounted for by foreign affiliates. 
Note: Industry Classification according to OECD-EUROSTAT (Laafia, 2002); also see Appendix 5B. 
Classification for services available at http://europa.eu.int/estatref/info/sdds/en/htec/htec_sectors.pdf  
Source: Authors’ calculations from Amadeus data set. 
 
4. Econometric Approach and Estimation Issues 
The approach and methodology taken in this paper follows along fairly standard lines 
which are well developed and adopted in previous studies (see e.g., Griffith, 1999). 
The main form of analysis will focus on production functions, as discussed in chapter 
2, from which TFP levels are estimated in an attempt to identify potential productivity 
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differences. The standard measurement technique describes the process in terms of a 
production function augmented by measures on foreign presence along industry and 
regional lines. This essentially involves estimating the following basic model: 
 
ititmitlitkit mlky                          (1) 
itrtj
East
i
West
i
F
iit DomDomMNE  ˆ               (2) 
 
where subscripts i, t, j, r refer to firm, year, industry and region respectively; yit, kit, lit, 
and mit represent the log of a firm’s output (sales) and the production inputs: capital 
(measured as the book value of fixed assets), labour17 (number of employees) and 
material costs respectively. In equation (1) it  represents the TFP residual while in 
equation (2) the it  represents the error term. To deflate monetary values we use the 
appropriate producer price index for each manufacturing industry and consumer price 
index for services. All price indices are taken from the German Federal Statistical 
Office. The dummy MNEF represents foreign subsidiaries. DomiEast and DomiWest refer 
to dummies for East German non-MNEs and West German non-MNEs, respectively. 
 
In terms of estimation, the first step essentially includes obtaining an estimate of TFP 
from (1), as the residual of the production function. The second step involves 
decomposing the TFP estimate into its determinants using (2). This paper divides 
foreign firms into three foreign ownership groups which are thought to exhibit 
variations in performance in accordance with previous studies (Criscuolo and Martin, 
2005): (a) firms owned by the United States, (b) firms owned by the member 
                                                 
17 There is no breakdown by type of labour or by skill but we can calculate the average wage which 
may serve as a proxy for the average level of human capital per worker. 
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countries of the European Union (excluding the ten new members) and (c) countries 
of the rest of the world (RoW) which mainly includes other OECD countries18.  
 
Further, we analyse productivity differences between subgroups of domestic firms, 
namely German MNEs, German non-MNEs located in the Western states and their 
counterpart in the East states, whereby the German MNEs acts as the reference group 
in the regressions. We further extend the analysis by allowing for differences, not 
only across industries, but also by testing whether ownership effects differ across 
industries with different levels of technological sophistication. Firms are grouped in 
line with Eurostat/OECD classification into Low and High technology-intensive 
sectors for manufacturing and the service sector (see Appendix 5B for classification). 
We control for both firm size and age. Firm age is measured in years and defined in 3 
age classes19: 1 to 10 years, 11 to 30 years and 31 years or older. Firm size is 
measured by the number of employees. Using a classification scheme common in 
German official statistics, we define the following size classes: 1-20 employees, 21 to 
49 employees, 50 to 99 employees, 100 to 249 employees, 250 to 499 employees, and 
500 employees or more. 
There are a number of econometric problems associated with estimating unobserved 
productivity as the residual of the production function, even with firm-level data on 
the capital, labour and material inputs. The most common problem concerns 
endogeneity. The endogeneity problem occurs when at least a part of the TFP is 
unobserved by the econometrician but observed by the firm at a time early enough so 
as to allow the firm to change the factor input decision. If that is the case, then profit 
                                                 
18 For example, a firm is classified as US-owned if either the country of the holding company or of the 
ultimate holding company is the US. If this is missing, the country of the holding company will be 
assumed to be Germany. Other foreign ownership countries are determined in a similar manner. 
19 A firm’s age is defined from the date of incorporation to the current financial year. 
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maximization implies that the realisation of the error term is expected to influence the 
decision on factor inputs. In other words, the regressors and the error term are 
correlated, which makes OLS estimation biased and inconsistent.  
 
The remedies to control for endogeneity include, among others, the Olley and Pakes 
(1996) approach (OP) which uses investment as an indicator or proxy for productivity 
shocks. However, one of the limitations of the OP approach is that it requires firms to 
make positive investments every year, which may not necessarily be present in actual 
firm-level data sets due to substantial adjustment costs following productivity shocks. 
This would cause the loss of a large number of observations. Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) (LP) extend the OP approach by using material inputs as a proxy to control for 
unobservable productivity shocks, as it is more common for firms to register material 
costs every year.  In other words, since a firms’ intermediate input typically responds 
more smoothly to productivity shocks than capital investment, the strict monotonicity 
assumption is more likely to hold. This makes material costs a better proxy to use in 
the inversion of the unobserved part of the production function (i.e. the intermediate 
demand function)20.  
This paper uses the latter approach to address the endogeneity problem. The 
advantage of this approach over more traditional estimation techniques is its ability to 
more effectively control for the correlation between unobservable productivity shocks 
and inputs. The argument is that in the presence of adjustment costs, materials are 
likely to react more rapidly than investments to any productivity shocks. 
 
                                                 
20 See Appendix 5C for a brief description of the LP technique. 
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A recent critique by Ackerberg et al. (2005) highlights the restrictiveness of assuming 
that labor is perfectly flexible in the LP approach, which may lead to a potential 
identification problem of the variable input (labour). To overcome the potential 
collinearity problem, they propose an extension of LP approach, which involves 
estimating the labour coefficient in the second stage, in contrast to LP and OP. In this 
regard, Wooldridge (2005) proposes an alternative more efficient, one-step GMM 
estimation approach. Nevertheless the LP remains one of the most popular approaches 
in the literature (see for example Smarzynska Javorcik 2004; Griffith et al. 2006), as 
none of these extensions or alternatives has yet to emerge as superior in all cases. We 
would stress that the LP estimation technique is consistent with a range of realistic 
underlying assumptions about firm behaviour, and in particular allows us to correct 
for the endogeneity problem of capital, particularly important in the context of FDI. 
5. Results 
Table 1 reports the results of three specifications of (2) for the manufacturing sector in 
high and low-technology industries. Table 2 presents the same for the service sector. 
The three specifications estimated differ only in the way firms are classified so as to 
shed light on productivity differences. The first specification (A) groups all foreign 
firms together whereas specification (B) distinguishes between three nationalities of 
foreign MNEs. Specification (C) extends this by examining different levels of 
holdings, testing for differences between minority-owned (10-50%) and majority-
owned (51-100%) foreign firms. The estimates of total factor productivity from (1) 
are derived using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach while (2) is estimated by 
OLS, with full sets of industry, region and time dummies21.  
                                                 
21 We do not present fixed effects estimation because the unobservable fixed effect is collinear with 
various time-invariant variables. 
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The coefficients on non-MNEs located in East and West Germany have the expected 
sign in that they are significantly different from zero and significantly different from 
each other across all specifications22. This is true for overall manufacturing, high-tech 
as well as low-tech manufacturing across all specifications. This seems to suggest that 
non-MNEs are less productive than German MNEs, namely 0.06-0.21 for Western 
non-MNEs and 0.21-0.41 for Eastern non-MNEs. Estimates for the foreign MNEs 
(MNEF) show a productivity advantage in overall and high-tech manufacturing of 
0.08 and 0.24, respectively, whereas in low-tech manufacturing a -0.10 disadvantage 
in productivity is shown.  
 
 
                                                 
22 Coefficients on dummy variables are not strictly elasticities (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980). 
However, in order to compare coefficients we have tested that coefficients are indeed significantly 
different from each other. 
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Table 5 Manufacturing (dependent variable: log TFP; reference group: MNED) 
Variable   Overall    
       A                 B                 C 
High-tech    
       A                 B                 C 
Low-tech    
       A                 B                 C 
Non-MNEs (West) -0.07*** 
(2.69) 
-0.06*** 
(2.61) 
-0.12*** 
(5.24) 
0.04 
(1.23) 
0.04 
(1.19) 
-0.03 
(0.87) 
-0.18*** 
(5.12) 
-0.18*** 
(5.01) 
-0.21*** 
(6.21) 
Non-MNEs (East) -0.22*** 
(2.85) 
-0.21*** 
(2.71) 
-0.29*** 
(3.85) 
-0.24* 
(1.94) 
-0.25** 
(2.01) 
-0.31** 
(2.54) 
-0.36*** 
(3.85) 
-0.33*** 
(3.47) 
-0.41*** 
(4.51) 
MNEF  0.08** 
(2.53) 
  0.24*** 
(5.34) 
  -0.10** 
(2.24) 
  
US 
 
 0.01 
(0.10) 
  0.12 
(1.49) 
  -0.07 
(0.56) 
 
EU 
 
 0.14*** 
(3.52) 
  0.27*** 
(4.75) 
  -0.03 
(0.51) 
 
RoW 
 
 -0.04 
(0.62) 
  0.27*** 
(3.73) 
  -0.31*** 
(3.33) 
 
MNEF (10-50%)   -0.13** 
(2.44) 
  -0.09 
(1.05) 
  -0.19*** 
(2.70) 
MNEF (>50%)   -0.04 
(1.27) 
  0.12*** 
(2.77) 
  -0.19*** 
 (4.66) 
Age & Size 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bayern 0.08** (2.43) 0.04 (0.79) 0.09** (2.26) 
Berlin -0.24*** (4.38) -0.40*** (5.05) -0.10 (1.27) 
Brandenburg -0.22*** (3.67) -0.12 (0.90) -0.17*** (2.66) 
Bremen 0.11 (1.31) -0.030** (2.33) 0.33*** (3.06) 
Hamburg 0.43*** (6.95) 0.25*** (3.46) 0.59*** (6.11) 
Hessen 0.03 (0.96) -0.014** (2.49) 0.17*** (3.55) 
Mecklenburg Vorp. -0.031*** (5.05) -0.66*** (4.96) -0.14** (2.03) 
Niedersachsen 0.04 (1.08) -0.04 (0.71) 0.08** (2.02) 
Nordrhein 
Westfalen 
0.05* (1.79) 0.02 (0.35) 0.07** (2.12) 
Rheinland Pfalz 0.03 (0.76) -0.05 (0.58) 0.08 (1.58)  
Saarland 0.33*** (3.97) 0.19 (1.52) 0.38*** (3.95) 
Sachsen -0.28*** (5.48) -0.46*** (5.61) -0.16** (2.41) 
Sachsen Anhalt -0.15** (1.98) -0.63*** (5.78) 0.08 (0.94) 
Schleswig Holstein 0.07 (1.05) 0.07 (0.72) 0.07 (0.79) 
Thüringen -0.25*** (3.85) -0.37** (2.55) -0.14* (1.94) 
F-stat 72.14 69.88 71.12 20.39 19.69 19.58 56.44 54.71 55.86 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.20 
No. of observations 12,419 12,419 12,419 4,964 4,964 4,964 7,455 7,455 7,455 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors in LP estimation are 
bootstrapped. Notes: Full sets of industry, regional and time dummies are included. Industries are grouped into High and Low technology sectors as is 
classified by OECD-Eurostat. Baden-Württemberg is used as reference state.  
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Specification (B) shows that firms owned by other OECD countries (i.e. RoW) are 
less productive in low-tech industries (-0.31) but more productive in high-tech 
industries (0.27). There is also evidence that EU firms are more productive in overall 
manufacturing and equally productive in high-tech industries as the RoW group 
(0.27). There is no evidence to suggest that US firms have any productivity advantage 
over German MNEs regardless of industry classification. Distinguishing between 
foreign-owned firms with minority and majority holdings demonstrates that minority-
owned foreign firms tend to be less productive than majority-owned foreign firms. In 
high-tech industries majority-owned foreign firms show a significant positive 
difference of 0.12 whereas in low-tech industries both types of ownership show a 0.19 
disadvantage in productivity vis-à-vis the reference group. Controlling for age and 
size reveals no discernable productivity advantage towards either older/younger or 
smaller/larger firms.  
 
Table 6 shows results for the German service sector. Once more, non-MNEs exhibit 
negative and statistically significant coefficients for high and low-tech service 
industries, as well as for the full sample. The exception is non-MNEs in Eastern 
Germany in low-tech industries. Foreign MNEs grouped together show no significant 
difference in either high or low-tech service industries. EU-owned firms show a slight 
significance of 0.14 in low-tech industries but more interestingly US-owned firms 
reveal a 0.37 productivity disadvantage in low-tech industries vis-à-vis German 
MNEs. The differentiation between minority and majority-owned foreign firms shows 
that the former are less productive at around 0.20 across industries, whereas the latter 
show a 0.13 advantage in overall services but no difference in high or low-tech 
industries. Again, estimates for age and size classes reveal no discernable productivity 
advantage towards either older/younger or smaller/larger firms. 
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Table 6 Services (dependent variable: log TFP; reference group: MNED) 
Variable Overall    
       A                 B                 C 
High-tech    
       A                 B                 C 
Low-tech    
       A                 B                 C 
non-MNEs (West) -0.07*** 
(2.69) 
-0.06*** 
(2.61) 
-0.29*** 
(8.94) 
-0.16*** 
(3.84) 
-0.16*** 
(3.84) 
-0.16*** 
(4.07) 
-0.42*** 
(7.49) 
-0.42*** 
(7.38) 
-0.43*** 
(8.46) 
non-MNEs (East) -0.22*** 
(2.85) 
-0.21*** 
(2.71) 
-0.24* 
(1.82) 
-0.44** 
(2.29) 
-0.46** 
(2.35) 
-0.46** 
(2.30) 
-0.08 
(0.58) 
-0.12 
(0.84) 
-0.11 
(0.75) 
MNEF  0.08** 
(2.53) 
  -0.03 
(0.47) 
  0.05 
(0.81) 
  
US 
 
 0.01 
(0.10) 
  -0.08 
(0.79) 
  -0.37*** 
(2.69) 
 
EU 
 
 0.14*** 
(3.52) 
  -0.06 
(0.86) 
  0.14* 
(1.80) 
 
RoW 
 
 -0.04 
(0.62) 
  0.10 
(0.86) 
  0.06 
(0.70) 
 
MNEF (10-50%)   -0.21*** 
(2.91) 
  -0.23*** 
(2.67) 
  -0.18* 
(1.69) 
MNEF (>50%)   0.13*** 
(3.37)  
  0.07 
(1.35) 
  0.06 
 (1.11) 
Age & Size 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bayern -0.12*** (3.11) -0.19*** (4.02) 0.02 (0.31) 
Berlin -0.32*** (6.44) -0.43*** (7.49) -0.17* (1.87) 
Brandenburg -0.64*** (7.12) -0.67*** (6.51) -0.55*** (3.46) 
Bremen -0.09 (1.33) 0.00 (0.01) -0.18* (1.76) 
Hamburg 0.17*** (2.88) -0.18** (2.28) 0.57*** (6.30) 
Hessen -0.03 (0.73) -0.09* (1.70) 0.11 (1.61) 
Mecklenburg Vorp. -0.76*** (10.17) -0.71*** (7.49) -0.76*** (6.58) 
Niedersachsen -0.09** (1.98) -0.08 (1.46) -0.07 (0.87) 
Nordrhein 
Westfalen 
-0.03 (0.85) -0.24*** (5.37) 0.23*** (4.14) 
Rheinland Pfalz -0.24*** (2.98) -0.42*** (4.61) -0.01 (0.12)  
Saarland 0.09 (0.74) 0.07 (0.42) 0.11 (0.70) 
Sachsen -0.76*** (14.37) -0.77*** (9.86) -0.64*** (8.79) 
Sachsen Anhalt -0.54*** (3.38) -0.67*** (3.63) -0.38* (1.77) 
Schleswig Holstein -0.30*** (4.17) -0.70***(7.19) 0.06(0.74) 
Thüringen -0.41***(3.52) -0.54***(3.79) -0.11 (0.60) 
F-stat 96.64 96.64 96.64 60.67 58.01 59.55 76.19 73.24 74.34 
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
No. of observations 10,967 10,967 10,967 5,895 5,895 5,895 5,072 5,072 5,072 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors in LP estimation are 
bootstrapped. Notes: Full sets of industry, regional and time dummies are included. Industries are grouped into High and Low technology sectors as is 
classified by OECD-Eurostat. Baden-Württemberg is used as reference state.  
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It is important to note that these ownership differences would not have been uncovered, had 
we compared foreign firms with all domestic firms. To make the point, table 7 shows a 
comparison between foreign firms versus all domestic firms, as has been done in previous 
studies. Our results show that foreign firms are significantly more productive than all 
domestic firms grouped together acting as the reference group. However, the specifications 
(A) to (C) in the previous tables have shown that such a simple comparison leads to biased 
results. 
 
Table 7  Simple comparison (dependent variable: log TFP ; 
reference group: domestic firms ) 
 
Variable Overall 
Manufact
. 
High-tech
Manufact
. 
Low-tech 
Manufact
. 
Overall 
Services 
High-tech 
Services 
Low-tech 
Services 
MNEF 0.14*** 
(4.86) 
0.22*** 
(5.72) 
0.04 
(0.89) 
0.31*** 
(8.77) 
0.10* 
(1.93) 
0.39*** 
(8.13) 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat 74.00 21.45 56.96 98.85 61.80 77.86 
R-squared 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.28 0.31 0.30 
No. of 
observations 
12419 4964 7455 10967 5895 5072 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors in LP estimation are bootstrapped. 
Note: Full sets of industry, regional and time dummies are included. Industries are 
grouped into High and Low technology sectors as is classified by OECD-Eurostat. 
 
The productivity gap also holds if we distinguish between Eastern firms which are in turn 
owned by West German parents versus East German parents (see table A1 in the 
Appendix). Being located in the East but owned by a West German firm shows a 
statistically significant productivity advantage of between 0.13 and 0.22 compared with 
East German owned firms. As our results show a significant productivity gap exists 
between East and West German firms, and so the question of catch-up is inevitable. 
Although our paper does not set out to provide a comprehensive analysis of catch-up in the 
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East, the results are nevertheless informative. In terms of productivity levels, Tables 5 and 6 
illustrate that the Eastern state dummies (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen) are mostly negative and significant along all 
specifications. However, with respect to the catching up issue, the table A2 in the Appendix 
shows average TFP growth figures for West and East for all industries in our analysis. 
While there exists significant heterogeneity in the total factor productivity growth across 
regions and industries, there is little evidence of catch up of the Eastern states.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper extends the existing literature on productivity differences between foreign-
owned firms and domestic firms. By presenting analysis of productivity (TFP) differences 
across three types of firms, operating in 22 manufacturing and 17 service industries in 
Germany we highlight considerable heterogeneity in firm performance. Estimating 
augmented production functions, this paper uses the semi-parametric approach proposed by 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to address the endogeneity problem.  
 
In general, while one can identify a “foreign” effect (foreign firms in Germany are in 
general more productive than domestic firms), to label this as “foreign ownership 
advantage” would be misleading. Rather, that while German non-MNEs are less productive 
than foreign-owned firms, there is no such difference between German MNEs and foreign-
owned subsidiaries. Equally, location within Germany is also important, as this productivity 
gap is more pronounced for firms which are located in the Eastern states. Furthermore, 
firms which are located in East Germany but in turn are owned by West German firms 
outperform firms with East German parents. 
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These results have two important policy implications. Firstly, in common with most 
European countries, there has been increased focus recently in Germany on attracting 
inward investment (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 2007). However, it is 
doubtful whether such a policy will contribute to productivity growth in Germany overall, 
though inward investment may boost productivity growth in the East.  The productivity 
advantage held by East German firms owned by a Western parent over an Eastern parent 
also suggests, in a similar vein to those reported by Castellani and Zanfei (2006) for Italy, 
that a focus on indigenous development may generate larger long term effects. However, 
there is so far little evidence of catch up of the Eastern states. 
 
Secondly, there is a large and growing literature concerned with the potential spillover or 
externality effects of inward investment. This is largely concerned with testing for 
productivity growth in the domestic sector following inward investment, and is predicated 
on the assumption that inward investors have higher productivity than the domestic firms. 
Generally, spillovers are expected where there are significant differences in productivity 
between types of firms. The results presented here suggest that the potential of any spillover 
effects can have two sources, namely foreign MNEs as well as domestic MNEs. Although 
this paper does not test for spillovers directly, it gives an indication of where such 
spillovers are most likely to occur. Indeed, disentangling differences in productivity is an 
important first step prior to any attempt to test for productivity spillovers. More 
specifically, our results suggest that any spillover effects from FDI into Germany may be 
limited to certain regions of the country, especially the eastern regions.  
 
Having investigated how differences in firm-level productivity relate to foreign and 
domestic ownership and multinationality, the focus of future research is to actually go 
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ahead and test for spillovers. As Germany is arguably the most technologically advanced 
economy in Europe, we might find that the dominant model of FDI into Germany may not 
be one of technology exploitation, but of “technology sourcing”, in that foreign MNEs may 
seek to invest in Germany, not in order to exploit existing firm specific advantages, but to 
acquire them from local firms. The extent to which such phenomena are observed in 
Germany is an empirical question, highlighting the need for further research in this area, 
particularly in the German context, with particular reference to future initiatives that may 
link inward investment to economic and technological development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26
Appendix  
 
 
Table A1:  Eastern firms owned by West-German parents 
Dependent Variable: log TFP 
Reference Group: Eastern firm owned by East-German parent 
Variable Overall 
Manufact. 
High-tech 
Manufact.
Low-tech 
Manufact.
Overall 
Services 
High-
tech 
Services 
Low-tech 
Services 
non-MNEs 
(East) owned by 
West German 
parent 
0.16*** 
(3.54) 
0.18*** 
(2.96) 
0.13** 
(2.00) 
0.17* 
(1.85) 
0.17 
(0.90) 
0.22** 
(2.13) 
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat 12.55 8.78 4.01 3.43 0.81 4.53 
No. of 
observations 
1727 906 821 1016 436 580 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Standard errors in LP estimation are bootstrapped. 
Notes: Full sets of industry, regional and time dummies are included. Industries are grouped into 
High and Low technology sectors as is classified by OECD-Eurostat.  
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Table A2:  Average TFP Growth (1995 to 2004) 
NACE Industry 
West  
Germany 
 
East 
Germany 
 
15 Food products and beverages 0.53 (5.91) 0.01 (5.78) 
17 Manufacture of textiles 0.19 (5.88) 0.01 (4.91) 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dying of fur 0.04 (6.31) 0.02 (5.38) 
19 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear
0.09 (5.83) -- 
20 
Manufacture of wood, products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles and straw 
0.03 (5.78) 0.04 (5.52) 
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 0.05 (5.96) 0.04 (5.32) 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.03 (5.95) 0.04 (5.51) 
23 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear 
fuel 
0.07 (6.38) 0.02 (6.61) 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.05 (6.09) 0.03 (5.61) 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.04 (5.94) 0.00 (5.64) 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.04 (5.67) 0.05 (5.24) 
27 Basic metals 0.05 (6.02) 0.07 (5.74) 
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 0.06 (5.86) 0.04 (5.68) 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c 0.05 (5.97) 0.04 (5.62) 
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 0.09 (6.00) 0.00 (6.96) 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 0.05 (5.98) 0.07 (5.74) 
32 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
0.06 (6.11) 0.09 (5.82) 
33 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 
0.03 (5.88) 0.03 (5.27) 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.06 (6.30) 0.00 (5.92) 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.05 (6.43) 0.04 (6.18) 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0.03 (5.97) 0.00 (5.12) 
37 Recycling -0.01(4.65) -- 
45 Construction 0.02 (9.56) 0.02 (8.55) 
50 
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
0.03 (10.21) 0.01 (9.32) 
51 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
0.03 (10.27) 0.03 (9.57) 
52 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair 
of personal and household goods 
0.02 (10.06) 0.03 (8.92) 
55 Hotels and restaurants 0.02 (9.01) 0.01 (9.01) 
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 0.00 (9.13) 0.00 (8.32) 
61 Water transport 0.02 (9.78) 0.00 (9.45) 
62 Air transport 0.03 (11.02) -- 
63 
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of 
travel agencies 
0.02 (9.81) 0.01 (8.63) 
64 Post and telecommunications 0.03 (10.02) -- 
65 
Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension 
funding 
0.03 (10.02) -- 
67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 0.00 (9.93) -- 
70 Real estate activities 0.01 (9.56) 0.01 (9.18) 
71 
Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of 
personal and household goods 
0.04 (10.23) 0.00 (8.69) 
72 Computer and related activities 0.02 (9.40) 0.01 (8.94) 
73 Research and development 0.02 (8.99) 0.02 (9.31) 
74 Other business activities 0.02 (9.99) 0.00 (8.71) 
Note: Average TFP in levels are given in brackets. 
 28
References 
Ackerberg, D., K. Caves, and G. Frazer (2005). Structural Identification of Production 
Functions. Working Paper, available at http://www.colorado.edu/ 
Economics/seminars/ackerberg.pdf 
Alvarez, R., and R. Lopez (2005). Exporting and Performance: Evidence from 
Chilean Plants. Canadian Journal of Economics 38 (4): 1384–1400. 
Arnold, J. M., and K. Hussinger (2006). Exports versus FDI in German Manufacturing: 
Firm Performance and Participation in International Markets. Discussion Paper 04/06. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main. 
Bellak, C., and M. Pfaffermayr (2002). Why Foreign-Owned Firms Are Different: 
A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence for Austria. In R. Jungnickel 
(ed.), Foreign-Owned Firms: Are They Different? Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Bellmann, L., and R Jungnickel (2002). Why Do Foreign-Owned Firms in Germany 
Achieve Above-Average Productivity? In R. Jungnickel (ed.), ForeignOwned Firms: Are 
They Different? Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Blalock, G., and P. Gertler (2004). Learning from Exporting: Revisited in a Less 
Developed Setting. Journal of Development Economics 75 (2): 397–416. 
Blomström, M., S. Globerman, and A. Kokko (2001). The Determinants of Host 
Country Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment. In N. Pain (ed.), Inward 
Investment, Technological Change and Growth. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Braconier, H., and K. Ekholm (2002). Locating Foreign Affiliates in Germany: 
The Case of Swedish Multinational Enterprises. In R. Jungnickel (ed.), ForeignOwned 
Firms: Are They Different? Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Budd, J. W., J. Konings, and M. J. Slaughter (2005). Wages and International Rent 
Sharing in Multinational Firms. Review of Economics and Statistics 87 (1): 73– 
84. 
Castellani, C., and A. Zanfei (2006). Attracting Foreign Investments or Promoting 
Domestic Multinationals? Evidence from Productivity Spillovers in Italy. Paper 
presented at EARIE, Amsterdam. 
Conyon, M., S. Girma, S. Thompson, and P. Wright (2004). Do Wages Rise or Fall 
Following Merger? Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 66 (5): 847–862. 
Criscuolo, C., and R. Martin (2005). Multinationals, Foreign Ownership and Productivity in 
UK Businesses. Working Paper 024. Advanced Institute of Management Research, London. 
 29
Davies, S. W., and B. R. Lyons (1991). Characterising Relative Performance: The 
Productivity Advantage of Foreign Owned Firms in the UK. Oxford Economic 
Papers 43 (4): 584–595. 
Doms, M. E., and B. J. Jensen (1998). Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity between 
Domestically and Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Establishments 
in the United States. In R. E. Baldwin, R. E. Lipsey, and J. D. Richardson (eds.), 
Geography and Ownership as Bases for Economic Accounting. Studies in Income 
and Wealth 59. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Department of Trade and Industry (2006). International Trade and Investment – 
The Economic Rationale for Government Support. Economics Paper 18, available at 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file32297.pdf 
Dunning, J. H. (1988). The Eclectic Paradigm of International Production: A Restatement 
and Some Possible Extensions. Journal of International Business 
Studies 19 (1): 1–31. 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (2007). Press Release Given 
by Federal Minister of Economics and Technology, Mr Michael Glos and 
The Federal Government Commissioner, Mr Wolfgang Tiefensee. Available 
at http://www.bmvbs.de/en/Federal-Government-Commissione/Economy-andinvestments-
,2575.985440/Tiefensee-and-Glos-Activities-.htm 
Globerman, S., J. C. Ries, and I. Vertinsky (1994). The Economic Performance of 
Foreign Affiliates in Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics 27 (1): 143–156. 
Görg, H., and D. Greenaway (2004). Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic 
Firms Really Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment? World Bank Research 
Observer 19 (2): 171–197. 
Griffith, R. (1999). Using the ARD establishment level data to look at foreign 
ownership and productivity in the United Kingdom. Economic Journal 109 
(June): 416–442. 
Griffith, R., and H. Simpson (2004). Characteristics of Foreign-Owned Firms in 
British Manufacturing. In D. Card, R. Blundell, and R. Freeman (eds.), Seeking a Premier 
Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980– 
2000. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Griffith, R., R. Redding, and H. Simpson (2004). Foreign Ownership and Productivity: New 
Evidence from the Service Sector and the R&D Lab. Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 20 (3): 440–456. 
 30
Griffith, R., R. Harrison, and J. Van Reenen (2006). How Special Is the Special 
Relationship? Using the Impact of US R&D Spillovers on UK Firms as a Test 
of Technology Sourcing. American Economic Review 96 (5): 1859–1875. 
Halvorsen, R., and R. Palmquist (1980). The Interpretation of Dummy Variables 
in Semilogarithmic Equations. American Economic Review 70 (3): 474–475. 
Helpman, E., M. J. Melitz, and S. R. Yeaple (2004). Export versus FDI with Heterogeneous 
Firms. American Economic Review 94 (1): 300–316. 
Howenstine, N. G., and W. J. Zeile (1992). Foreign Direct Investment in the 
United States: Establishment Data for 1987. Survey of Current Business 72 (10): 
44–78. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (1993). Balance of Payments Manual. Fifth 
Edition. Washington D.C.: IMF. 
Konings, J., and A. Murphy (2006). Do Multinational Enterprises Relocate Employment to 
Low-Wage Regions? Evidence from European Multinationals. 
Review of World Economics/Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 142 (1): 1–20. 
Laafia, I. (2002). Employment in High Tech and Knowledge Intensive Sectors in 
the EU Continues to Grow in 2001. Eurostat, Statistics in Focus: Science and 
Technology 9 (4): 1–8. 
Levinsohn, J., and A. Petrin (2003). Estimating Production Functions Using 
Inputs to Control for Unobservables. Review of Economic Studies 70 (2): 
317–341. 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation) (1996). Benchmark Definition of 
Foreign Direct Investment. Third Edition. Paris: OECD. 
Olley, S., and A. Pakes (1996). The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications 
Equipment Industry. Econometrica 64 (6): 1263–1298. 
Oulton, N. (1998a). Investment, Capital and Foreign Ownership in UK Manufacturing. 
NIESR Discussion Paper 141. National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research, London. 
Oulton, N. (1998b). Labour Productivity and Foreign Ownership. NIESR Discussion Paper 
143. National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London. 
Peri, G., and D. Urban (2006). Catching-up to Foreign Technology? Evidence on 
the Veblen-Gerschenkron Effect of Foreign Investments. Regional Science and 
Urban Economics 36 (1): 72–98. 
Sinn, H. W. (2000). Germany’s Economic Unification: An Assessment after Ten 
 31
Years. NBER Working Paper 7586. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
Smarzynska Javorcik, B. (2004). Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity 
of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages. American 
Economic Review 94 (3): 605–627. 
Wagner, J. (2006). Exports, Foreign Direct Investment, and Productivity: Evidence 
from German Firm-Level Data. Applied Economics Letters 13 (6): 347–349. 
Wooldridge, J. (2005). On Estimating Firm-Level Production Functions Using 
Proxy Variables to Control for Unobservables. Working Paper available at 
http://www.msu.edu/∼ec/faculty/wooldridge/current%20research/panel8r2.pdf 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2005). World 
Investment Report 2005. New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
